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Abstract:
The two principal areas of natural language processing
research in pragmatics are belief modelling and speech
act processing. Belief modelling is the development of
techniques to represent the mental attitudes of a dia-
logue participant. The latter approach, speech act
processing, based on speech act theory, involves view-
ing dialogue in planning terms. Utterances in a dia-
logue are modelled as steps in a plan where
understanding an utterance involves deriving the com-
plete plan a speaker is attempting to achieve. How-
ever, previous speech act based approaches have been
limited by a reliance upon relatively simplistic belief
modelling techniques and their relationship to plan-
ning and plan recognition. In particular, such tech-
niques assume precomputed nested belief structures.
In this paper, we will present an approach to speech
act processing based on novel belief modelling tech-
niques where nested beliefs are propagated on
demand.
1. Introduction
The use of simplistic belief models has accompanied
complex accounts of speech acts where highly nested belief
sets accompany any speech act. We believe that by utilising
a more sophisticated view of mental attitudes, a simpler and
more elegant theory of speech acts can be constructed. Also,
as previous work has pointed out (Wilks et al, 1991) past
models have failed to differentiate explicitly between the
speaker’s and hearer’s belief sets. Such a failure causes
problems in dealing with misconceptions and badly formed
plans (Pollack, 1990).
This paper augments ViewGen, a computer program
originally developed by Ballim and Wilks (1991) to model
the beliefs and meta-beliefs of a system using nested belief
structures. ViewGen is able to reason about its own and
other agent’s beliefs using belief ascription and inference
techniques. The current version of ViewGen is implemented
in Quintus Prolog.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, we
review and discuss previous speech act approaches and their
representation of mental attitudes. We argue that precom-
puted highly nested belief structures aren’t necessary. In
Section 3, we describe how ViewGen represents mental atti-
tudes and computes nested structures by a process of ascrip-
tion and in Section 4, show how such techniques can be used
to represent speech acts for use in planning and plan recog-
nition. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss some implications
and future directions of our work
2. Speech acts and mental attitudes
It is clear that any understanding of an utterance must
involve reference to the attitudes of the speaker. For exam-
ple, the full understanding of the utterance “Do you know
where Thomas is?” depends upon whether the speaker
already knows where Thomas is and whether he or she
believes the hearer knows.
Speech act based AI approaches normally make refer-
ence to mental attitudes and often provide links between the
surface form of the utterance and the mental attitudes of both
the speaker and hearer. For example, Appelt (1985)
describes a system which generates discourse from an inten-
sional logic representation of a set of beliefs. However, as
pointed out by Pollack (1990), they have typically used rela-
tively simple models of such attitudes. In particular, previ-
ous approaches have lacked any way to model the
propagation of belief within the system itself and instead
have made use of precomputed and fixed nestings of mental
attitudes.
One widely used concept in speech act accounts is
mutual belief. Following work in philosophy by Lewis
(1969), Clark and Marshall (1981) introduced the notion of
mutual belief to account for hearer attitudes. A proposition P
is a mutual belief if shared by two agents A and B such that:
A believes P
B believes P
A believes B believes P
B believes A believes P
etc., ad infinitum
There cannot be a logical limit to the number of levels of
regression since, as Schiffer (1972) argued, for any level of
nested belief, a dialogue example can be constructed which
requires an additional level of belief nesting. Because of this
potentially infinite regression, it has proven difficult to use
an axiomatic definition of mutual belief based in terms of
simple belief in computational implementations. Alternative
approaches have either avoided defining axioms for mutual
belief, e.g. Taylor and Whitehill (1981) or defined it as a
primitive operator without reference to simple beliefs, e.g.
Cohen and Levesque (1985).
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Despite such work, it appears that the mutual belief
hypothesis, i.e. that agents compute potentially infinite nest-
ings of belief in comprehension, appears to be too strong a
hypothesis to be realistic. It is impossible that agents per-
form this kind of potentially infinite nesting during real dia-
logue and no clear constraint can be given on how many
iterations would be necessary in a real dialogue situation.
Though examples can be artificially created which require n
levels of nesting for large n, during a study of dialogue cor-
pora, Lee (1994) found no need for highly nested belief
models. In fact, it appears that no dialogue exchange
required more than a two level belief nesting. Also, mistakes
in assuming what was common to both agents in a dialogue
occurred but were quickly repaired through the use of cor-
rections and repetitions and other dialogue control acts. Sim-
ilar results have been reported by Taylor and Carletta (1994)
in analysing the HCRC Map Task corpus.
Rather than compute nested beliefs to some fixed level
during comprehension. It is far more plausible that agents
compute nested representations on so that highly nested
belief representations are only constructed if required in the
dialogue. This is the basic principle behind ViewGen.
3. The ViewGen system
ViewGen is a nested attitude model which constructs
intensional environments to model the attitudes of other
agents. Previous work on ViewGen has been concerned with
only modelling belief attitudes (Wilks, Barnden and Ballim,
1991). We have extended ViewGen to model and represent,
in addition, goals and intentions. In this section, we briefly
describe ViewGen’s operation.
3.1 ViewGen representations of mental
attitudes
ViewGen assumes that each agent in a dialogue has a
belief environment which includes attitudes about what
other agents believe, want, and intend. Such attitudes are
represented in a nested structure. Each nesting is an environ-
ment which contains propositions which may be grouped by
a particular topic or stereotype. The particular topic is given
on the top left corner of the environment while the holder of
a belief is given at the bottom of the environment.
ViewGen represents all attitudes in environments with
the attitude type labelled on the far right bottom of the box.
Though different attitude types are separated by environ-
ments, they can be nested so that agents can have beliefs,
goals, and intentions about these attitudes. For example,
suppose the System believes that John intends to buy a car,
but wants to convince him otherwise by getting him to
believe correctly that the car is a wreck. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.
In ViewGen, different attitudes have different types.
Beliefs and goals refer to propositions which the agent either
believes is true or wants to be true at some point in the
future. Intentions, however, are represented as connected
planning actions which represent the plans the agent intends
to pursue to achieve his or her goals.
3.2 Ascription of attitudes
As noted above, ViewGen avoids using a concept of
shared or mutual beliefs. Rather, ViewGen attributes beliefs,
goals and intentions to other agents as required. This process
is termed ascription. There are two methods of ascription:
default ascription and stereotypical ascription. Each method
is briefly described below.
3.2.1 Default Ascription
Default ascription applies to common beliefs. Most
beliefs in any set held by an agent are common beliefs about
the world, and can be assumed to be common to any other
rational agent unless marked otherwise. For example, an
agent may believe that the world is round and therefore,
without any evidence, guess that any other agent probably
shares this belief. To model this, ViewGen uses a default
ascription rule i.e.
Default Ascription rule:
Given a System belief, ascribe it to any other agent as
required, unless there is contrary evidence.
Such a rule results in beliefs being pushed from outer
belief environments to inner belief environments. For exam-
ple, Figure 2 illustrates ViewGen assuming that John shares
its belief that the world is round.
Evidence against ascription is normally an explicit belief
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Figure 1: Meta-attitudes on other attitudes
that an another agent believes the opposite of the ascribed
belief. For example, an agent might already be believed by
ViewGen to believe the world is flat and thus block any
ascription of ViewGen’s belief. It is important for ViewGen
to reason about other agent’s beliefs about other agents. For
example, it is plausible that an agent who believes the world
is round may well also believe by default that other agents
believe the same.
Unlike beliefs, the assumption that other agents share
similar goals and intentions cannot be made by default.
Goals and intentions are more dynamic than beliefs in that
an agent will try to achieve goals and carry out intentions in
the future which once achieved are dropped from the agent’s
attitude set. Also, goals and intentions are often highly stere-
otypical. Therefore, a default rule of ascription cannot be
applied to such attitudes. However, a combination of stereo-
typical ascription and plan recognition can be used to pro-
vide sensible ascriptions of goals and intentions.
Stereotypical ascription is discussed next while plan recog-
nition is discussed in 4.3.
3.2.2 Stereotypical Ascription
A stereotype is a collection of attitudes which are gener-
ally applicable to a particular class of agent. For example,
Doctors tend to have expert medical knowledge and have
goals to diagnose diseases and cure patients. To model this
ViewGen uses a stereotypical ascription rule:
Stereotypical Ascription rule:
Given a System stereotypical belief, ascribe it to any
other agent to which the stereotype applies
as required, unless there is contrary evidence.
In ViewGen, stereotypes consist of sets of attitudes
which an agent who fits a particular stereotype might typi-
cally hold. Such stereotypical beliefs can be ascribed to an
agent by default - i.e. unless there is explicit evidence that
the agent holds a contrary belief. For example, in Figure 3,
the System has a stereotypical set of beliefs for doctors and,
since it believes John is a doctor, ascribes these to John.
4. Ascription based Speech act rep-
resentation
In this section, we will outline our theory of speech acts.
In 4.1, we outline a list of features which we believe any the-
ory should possess and in 4.2 we describe a theory based on
belief ascription.
4.1 Desideratum for a theory of speech
acts
We believe that a theory of speech acts should have at
least the following features:
1, The theory should be solipsist
The notion of mutual knowledge was introduced to pro-
vide a realistic account of the effects of a speech act on a
hearer. However, as has argued above and elsewhere (Ballim
and Wilks, 1991), mutual belief is too strong a notion to be
used. Instead, a theory of speech acts should be solipsistic in
that it refers solely to finite belief representations of either
the speaker or hearer of the dialogue act.
System
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Figure 2: ViewGen default ascription
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Figure 3: Stereotypical ascription of medical knowledge
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2, The theory must provide separate interpretations for the
speaker and hearer
A theory must, however, take into account the attitudes
of both the speaker and hearer by allowing the separate deri-
vation of the effects of a speech act from the speaker’s and
the hearer’s points of view.
3, Speech acts should be minimalistic
Any theory should assume only the minimal conditions
for any utterance to be successful. This means avoiding the
ascription of precomputed attitude nestings beyond the
essential conditions of each act for the act to be achieved.
4, Speech acts should be extendable
Despite assuming only the minimal conditions and
effects for any speech act, they should in principle be
extendable to deal with problematic examples involving
high degrees of belief nesting proposed by work in philoso-
phy.
5, The theory must provide a means to derive generalised
effects from each acts conditions
As argued by Searle (1969), any classification of speech
acts must be based on the conditions of each act and not its
effects. However, we also want a principled way to derive
the conventional effects of any act from its conditions. This
is necessary so that we can then provide a clear distinction
between an act’s conventional illocutionary effect and its
context-specific perlocutionary effect.
We believe that our account of speech acts satisfies the
above criteria. In the next two sections we will outline how
we represent speech acts in terms of belief ascription and
how we use these in planning and plan recognition.
4.2 An ascription based theory of speech
acts
We represent 20 different speech acts types in four
classes: questions, answers, requests and inform acts. This
set is partially based on Bunt’s taxonomy of 24 speech acts
(1989). While not claiming that such a set of acts is com-
plete, we have found it sufficient for the dialogue corpora we
have analysed. Every act is classified with respect to its pre-
conditions which are the mental attitudes a speaker must
adopt to felicitously perform the speech act. Acts are
ordered by specificity: more specific speech acts inherit or
strengthen the preconditions of more general ones. For
example, an inform act requires that the speaker believes the
proposition in question and has a goal that the hearer also
believes the proposition, i.e.:
A correction act is a more specific type of informing
and, therefore, inherits the preconditions of informing plus
the condition that the speaker believes that the hearer
believes the opposition of the proposition, i.e.:
Rather than specify individual effects for each dialogue
act, we provide separate update rules based on belief ascrip-
tion. Our update rule from the speaker’s point of view is:
That is, for every condition in the speech act, the speaker
must ascribe a belief to the hearer that the condition is satis-
fied. For example, Figure 4 shows the conditions for an
inform act: the speaker believes the proposition to be com-
municated and wants the hearer to believe it too. To achieve
this goal, the speaker intends to use an inform speech act.
After performing the inform act, the speaker can ascribe to
the hearer the belief that each of the preconditions were met
i.e. the speaker believes that the hearer believes the speaker
believes the proposition and has the goal of getting the
hearer to believe it too. The effects of the inform act on the
speaker’s attitude set are shown in Figure 5. Note that after
the inform act is performed, the intention to perform it is
dropped. However, the speaker’s goal of getting the hearer
to believe the proposition remains. This is because we
assume only the minimal conditions for the act to be suc-
cessful i.e. if the speaker can successfully ascribe each
speech act precondition to the hearer. For the hearer to
believe the proposition, he or she has to perform a mental
Inform(Speaker,Hearer,Proposition)
Preconditions: believe(Speaker,Proposition)
goal(Speaker,believe(Hearer,Proposition)
Correction(Speaker,Hearer,Proposition)
Preconditions: believe(Speaker,Proposition)
goal(Speaker,believe(Hearer,Proposition)
believe(Speaker,believe(Hearer,
 not(Proposition)))
For every condition C in dialogue act performed:
default_ascribe(Speaker, Hearer, believe(C))
Update on the Speaker’s belief set
Belief
Intention
Goal
Belief
on(coffee, stove)
Speaker
Speaker
Speaker
Hearer
Speaker
inform(Speaker,Hearer,on(coffee,stove))
Figure 4: Representation of a speaker’s attitudes before performing an inform act
on(coffee, stove)
act. Mental acts are detailed in the next section. The update
rule for the hearer is the converse of the speaker’s:
That is, given that the speaker has performed an inform
act, the hearer can ascribe to the speaker the preconditions of
the inform act assuming that the speaker is being coopera-
tive. The effects of the inform act are shown in Figure 6.
Note that the hearer’s update rule is one level less nested: the
preconditions rather than beliefs about the preconditions are
ascribed.
4.3 Planning and plan simulation in nested
belief environments
ViewGen uses a non-linear POCL planner (McAllester
and Rosenblatt, 1991) to plan actions to achieve goals. Such
a planner is provably correct and complete so that it is guar-
Update on the Hearer’s belief set
For every condition C in dialogue act performed:
default_ascribe(Hearer,Speaker, C)
anteed to find a solution if one exists and only generates
valid solutions.
Since ViewGen represents the attitudes of agents in
nested environments, it is able to use the planner to simulate
other agent’s planning. This simulation can be applied to any
depth of nested belief e.g. ViewGen can simulate John simu-
lating Mary generating a plan to achieve a given goal by
considering its beliefs of John’s beliefs of Mary’s beliefs,
goals and intentions.
Which plan is constructed depends on what the nested
agent is believed to believe. Therefore, during nested plan-
ning, ViewGen has to reason about which beliefs are held to
be true at that level of nesting. However, as mentioned
above, belief ascription only is performed as required: we
cannot predict which beliefs will be relevant to a plan before
the plan is constructed and therefore, ascription must be per-
formed as the plan is generated. To achieve this, both types
Belief
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BeliefHearer
BeliefHearer
on(coffee, stove)
Speaker Goal
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Figure 5: Representation of a speaker’s attitudes after performing an inform act
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Figure 6: Representation of a hearer’s attitudes after an inform act
of ascription are represented in plan operator notation as
mental acts. For example, default belief ascription as
detailed in section 3.2.1 is represented as:
In addition to pushing outer nested beliefs into inner
environments, we require a method of adopting other agent’s
beliefs by pushing inner nested beliefs into outer environ-
ments. For this, we have an accept-belief operator:
That is, if an Agent2 has some belief and Agent1 doesn’t
hold a contrary belief and believes that Agent2 is trustwor-
thy, then it is acceptable for Agent1 to also believe Agent2’s
belief. This plays a role in informing where a hearer must
decide whether or not to believe the communicated proposi-
tion.
During planning, plans are constructed based on the
beliefs, goals and intentions which are explicitly present at
that level of nesting. However, if a proposition isn’t repre-
sented at this level of nesting, then the POCL planner must
plan ascription actions to determine whether the simulated
agent holds the relevant attitude. Therefore, simulated plan-
ning involves two types of planning: planning by the agent
simulated and planning by ViewGen itself to maintain its
belief representation of the agent.
In addition to plan simulation, we have extended the
basic POCL algorithm to allow other agent’s plans to be rec-
ognised. This involves inferring from an agent’s performed
action, the agent’s set of goals he or she is trying to achieve
and the plan he or she intends to follow to achieve these
goals. This is achieved by collecting together the ascribable
goals at the particular level of nesting and attempting to find
a plan which achieves at least one of the ascribable goals.
Once a plan is generated, any goals achieved by the plan are
ascribed.
In both simulation and recognition, once an acceptable
plan is generated, the actions and goals in the plan are
ascribed to the agent at that level of nesting.
5. Conclusions and future work
We have argued that the computation of highly nested
belief structures during the performance or recognition of a
speech act is implausible. In particular, the concept of
mutual belief seems too strong. Instead, we have put forward
a theory of speech acts where only the minimal set of beliefs
is ascribed at the time of the utterance. If further belief nest-
ings are required then they can be derived using belief
ascription techniques as required.
Default_belief_ascription(Agent1, Agent2, Proposition)
Preconditions: belief(Agent1, Proposition)
belief(Agent1, not(belief(Agent2,
not(Proposition))))
Effects: belief(Agent1, belief(Agent2, Proposition))
Accept_belief(Agent1, Agent2, Proposition)
Preconditions: belief(Agent1, belief(Agent2, Proposition))
not(belief(Agent1, not(Proposition)))
belief(Agent1,trustworthy(Agent2))
Effects: belief(Agent1,Proposition)
We believe that, for the most part, during normal dia-
logue, the minimal effects of any speech act are all that are
required. However, our approach allows highly nested belief
structures to be computed on demand if required, for exam-
ple, to understand non-conventional language use.
Future work includes the attachment of a robust dia-
logue parser. We also intend to link ViewGen to the LaSie
information extraction platform (Gaizaukas et al, 1995) so
as to develop a testable belief set empirically derived from a
small medical domain corpus.
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